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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW
Kathleen M. McCauley *
William F. Demarest III **

For many years, medical malpractice law in Virginia remained
static and somewhat predictable. Historically, Annual Survey
medical malpractice articles focused on infrequent statutory
amendments and the handful of cases that came down from the
Supreme Court of Virginia each year,1 which were often more important for their facts than their law. Medical malpractice cases
in the supreme court, however, have become increasingly common, and the once predictable outcomes have become more unpredictable. In recognition of this changing landscape, Part I of
this article looks at what to expect in the coming year from the
Virginia General Assembly, and Part II details similar expectations from the courts. Part III examines major legislation from
the 2008 General Assembly Session. Part IV addresses decisions
by the supreme court during the past year.
I. THE YEAR TO COME IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The Virginia General Assembly has not made many major
changes to the Medical Malpractice Act2 in recent years. Although it has passed a number of health care statutes and minor
amendments, the General Assembly has not passed any major
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Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. J.D., 1995, Dickinson School of
Law, The Pennsylvania State University; B.A., 1990, College of William and Mary.
** J.D. Candidate, Class of 2009, University of Richmond School of Law.
1. See, e.g., Sean P. Byrne & Paul Walkinshaw, Annual Survey of Virginia Law:
Health Care Law, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 441 (2007); Kathleen M. McCauley & Dana A. Dews,
Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Medical MalpracticeLaw, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 231 (2006);
Kathleen M. McCauley, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Health Care Law, 38 U. RICH. L.
REV. 137 (2003).
2. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-581.1 to -581.20:1 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Supp. 2008).
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legislation. The 2009 Session, however, will likely involve more
General Assembly action concerning medical malpractice and related laws.
A. Medical Malpractice Cap
As part of the tort reform measures passed in 1976, Virginia
adopted a medical malpractice cap on damages. 3 The General Assembly has amended the cap numerous times since its passage.
In 1999, the General Assembly amended the cap to include an increase in coverage every year until 2008.4 The cap has risen steadily from $1.5 million for causes of action accruing after 1999 to
its current level of $2 million for causes of action accruing after
July 1, 2008.5 However, the statute provides that "[t]he July 1,
2008, increase shall be the final annual increase." 6 The 2008
General Assembly did not amend or even address the statute. Accordingly, a flurry of activity likely will occur in the 2009 Session
with regard to this important aspect of the Medical Malpractice
Act.
As Peter Vieth recently stated, "Familiar battle lines between
plaintiffs' lawyers and doctors will be forming soon over a possible
increase in Virginia's $2 million cap on damages in medical malpractice cases." 7 The Medical Society of Virginia ("MSV") argues
that "[t]he cap protects the health, safety, and welfare of patients
by ensuring the availability of health care providers and the adequacy of health services in Virginia."8 MSV urges that there be no
additional increases in the cap. 9 The Virginia Trial Lawyers Association ("VTLA") has not yet stated its formal position on the
cap but likely will weigh in before the next legislative session be-

3. Act of Apr. 9, 1976, ch. 611, 1976 Va. Acts 784 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Repl. Vol. 2007)).
4. Act of Mar. 28, 1999, ch. 711, 1999 Va. Acts 1190 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Repl. Vol. 2007)).
5. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15.
6. Id.
7. Peter Vieth, Med-Mal Cap Fight on Horizon for 2009, VA. LAW. WKLY., Aug. 4,
2008, at 1, 19.
8. Medical Society of Virginia, Medical Malpractice Cap, MSV Backgrounder, (Oct.
19, 2007), http://www.msv.org/files/publicl%2708malpracticecapbackgrounder.pdf.
9. Id.
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gins. 10 Several publications, however, have already begun actively writing and lobbying to change the cap.11
Virginia has a global cap on all damages related to the alleged
injury.12 Of those states with caps on recovery, the majority only
caps non-economic damages (e.g., pain and suffering, loss of consortium, emotional distress, punitive damages, etc).1 3 The upcoming legislative session likely will include proposals to increase the
cap, to abolish the cap, and perhaps even to adopt a non-economic
damages cap instead. At the end of the day, the General Assembly likely will not abolish the limitation entirely or limit the cap
to non-economic damages. Instead, the legislature probably will
change the incremental increase going forward or apply some
type of annual index to the overall cap to keep pace with the cost
of living and the ever-increasing cost of medical care in the United States.
B. PeerReview Statutes
The Medical Malpractice Act includes two sections commonly
referred to as "Peer Review Statutes."14 The purpose of these statutes is to shield peer review participants and documents from
liability and discovery. 15 Virginia Code section 8.01-581.17 provides, among other things:

10. Plaintiffs' attorneys have challenged the constitutionality of the medical malpractice cap on several occasions. However, the Supreme Court of Virginia twice defended the
cap's constitutionality. See Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Serv., 257 Va. 1, 7, 509 S.E.2d
307, 310 (1999); Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosps., 237 Va. 87, 97, 100-01, 103-04, 376 S.E.2d
525, 529, 531-34 (1989).
11. See, e.g., Editorial, Malpractice Victims out of Luck in Virginia, ROANOKE TIMES,
June 8, 2008, Horizon Editorial, at 2.
12. See generally Bulala v. Boyd, 239 Va. 218, 228, 389 S.E.2d 670, 675 (1990) (holding that the cap limits the total amount of damages recoverable by a plaintiff).
13. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 1997 & Supp. 2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
768.73 (West 2006 & Supp. 2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701 (2005 & Supp. 2007); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60H (LexisNexis 2000 & Supp. 2008); MO. ANN. STAT. § 538.215
(West 2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508.4-d (1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-42-02 (1996);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-32-220 (Supp. 2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.56.250 (West 2006);
WIS. STAT. ANN, § 655.017 (West Supp. 2007).
14. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-581.16, -581.17 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Supp. 2008).
15. See id.; see also Christopher S. Morter, Note, The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986: Will Physicians Find Peer Review More Inviting?, 74 VA. L. REV. 1115,
1131-37 (1988).
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The proceedings, minutes, records, and reports of any (i) medical
staff committee, utilization review committee, or other committee,
board, group, commission or other entity as specified in § 8.01581.16; (ii) nonprofit entity that provides a centralized credentialing
service; or (iii) quality assurance, quality of care, or peer review
committee ... together with all communications, both oral and written, originating in or provided to such committees or entities, are
privileged communications which may not be disclosed or obtained
by legal discovery proceedings unless a circuit court, after a hearing
and for good cause arising from extraordinary circumstances being
shown, orders the disclosure of such proceedings, minutes, records,
reports, or communications.... Nothing in this section shall be construed as providing any privilege to health care provider, emergency
medical services agency, community services board, or behavioral
health authority medical records kept with respect to any patient in
the ordinary course of business of operating a hospital, emergency
medical services agency, community services board, or behavioral
health authority nor to any facts or information contained in such
records nor shall this section preclude or affect discovery of or production of evidence relating to hospitalization or treatment of any
patient in the ordinary course of hospitalization of such patient. 16

The scope of these protections was the focus of the Supreme
Court of Virginia's opinion in Riverside Hospital, Inc. v. Johnson.1 7 The Johnson opinion limited the scope of section 8.01581.17 regarding discovery of peer review related documents.
Specifically, the court declared that the statute does not protect
factual incident reports even if produced for or by a peer review
committee. 18 The court stated:
The use of this factual information in some way in the peer review or
quality care committee process alone is insufficient to automatically
cloak such information with the protection of non-disclosure. Factual
patient care incident information that does not contain or reflect any
committee discussion or action by the committee reviewing the information is not the type of information that must "necessarily be
confidential" in order to allow participation in the peer or quality assurance review process. 19

Thus, some documents once assumed protected are now discoverable as a result of Johnson.

16. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.17(B)-(C) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Supp. 2008).
17. See 272 Va. 518, 636 S.E.2d 416 (2006). For a detailed analysis of the court's opinion, see Byrne & Walkinshaw, supra note 1, at 443-47.
18. Johnson, 272 Va. at 533-34, 636 S.E.2d at 424-25.
19. Id. at 533, 636 S.E.2d at 424.

2008]

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

In response to the Johnson opinion, Delegate John M.
O'Bannon, III offered House Bill 382 to amend section 8.01581.17.20 The bill would add the following language to the statute:
Delivery to a committee or other entity specified in § 8.01-581.16 of
information that was not restricted information prior to its delivery
to such committee or other entity shall not make such document restricted information; however, the fact of delivery to such committee
or other entity and the content of any communication accompanying
the information shall be restricted information. Information created
at the request of or for the express purpose of review by a committee
or other entity specified in § 8.01-581.16 shall constitute restricted
information without regard to the nature of the information con21
tained therein.

Thus, O'Bannon's bill would abrogate the Johnson ruling. The
General Assembly, however, continued the bill in the House
Committee for Courts of Justice until the 2009 Session. 2 2 Hospitals, medical schools, physician practice groups, and their counsel
will be watching this legislation closely next spring, attempting to
maintain the protection afforded to those other categories of peer
review materials covered under the statute.
C. Response to Hicks v. Mellis
The General Assembly likely will address Virginia Code section
8.01-335(B)23 in the coming year after the Supreme Court of Virginia's recent decision in Hicks v. Mellis.24 Section 8.01-335(B)
provides:
Any court in which is pending a case wherein for more than three
years there has been no order or proceeding, except to continue it,
may, in its discretion, order it to be struck from its docket and the
action shall thereby be discontinued.... Any case discontinued or
dismissed under the provisions of this subsection may be reinstated,
on motion, after notice to the parties in interest, if known, or their
counsel of record within one year from the date of such order but not
25
after.

20. H.B. 382, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008).
21. Id.
22. See Legislative Information System, Bill Tracking, H.B. 382, http://legl.state.
va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?ses=081&typ=bil&val=hb382 (last visited Oct. 28, 2008).
23. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-335(B) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Supp. 2008).
24. 275 Va. 213, 657 S.E.2d 142 (2008).
25. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-335(B) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Supp. 2008).
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In Hicks, the court addressed the notice portion of the statute,
specifically, whether the statute's language that the case "may be
reinstated, on motion, after notice to the parties in interest, if
known" created a jurisdictional requirement. 26
The Hicks case involved an incredibly complicated procedural
history. 2 7 The plaintiff filed the first motion for judgment in the
Circuit Court for the City of Richmond in 1993 for events that occurred in 1990.28 The trial court granted her request for a voluntary nonsuit in 1995, more than two years after she first filed
suit.2 9 Four years later, the plaintiff filed a second motion for
judgment.30 In 2003, the circuit court struck the case from its
docket pursuant to the three-year rule of section 8.01-335(B).31
The plaintiff filed for, and was granted, reinstatement of her
claim ten months later. 32 She obtained a second voluntary nonsuit in 2004.33 On the same day that the circuit court granted the
second nonsuit, the plaintiff filed a third motion for judgment,
naming Dr. Mellis as the sole defendant.34 The defendant was
served with this motion in 2005.35 This was the first time Dr.
Mellis was served and, in fact, it was his first notice of the lawsuit, even though he had been named in a prior motion for judgment. 3 6 The defendant filed a plea of the statute of limitations,
and the circuit court dismissed the claim with prejudice. 3 7 The
circuit court's decision focused on the plaintiffs failure to notify
the defendant prior to the reinstatement as required by section
8.01-335(B).38
The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed with the circuit
court's interpretation of section 8.01-335(B).39 After examining
26. Hicks, 275 Va. at 218-19, 657 S.E.2d at 145 (emphasis added).
27. Id. at 218, 657 S.E.2d at 144.
28. Id. at 216, 657 S.E.2d at 143. Because the plaintiff brought suit on behalf of her
three-year-old child, id., the suit was tolled by Virginia Code section 8.01-243.1. VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-243.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
29. Hicks, 275 Va. at 216, 657 S.E.2d at 143.
30. Id.
31. Id., 657 S.E.2d at 143-44.
32. Id., 657 S.E.2d at 144.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 217, 657 S.E.2d at 144.
36. Id. at 216-17, 657 S.E.2d at 143-44.
37. Id. at 217, 657 S.E.2d at 144.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 219, 657 S.E.2d at 145.
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the statutory text, the court concluded that "a circuit court may
enter an order reinstating a discontinued case only after notice is
given to known parties in interest."40 The court also concluded
that the circuit court erred by reinstating the case in 2003, given
that the plaintiff had not notified the defendant by that time. 4 1
The court then addressed whether this "requirement" made the
circuit court's decision void ab initio or merely voidable.42 If the
decision was void ab initio, then the 2004 nonsuit, a final order,
was a nullity, and the defendant could challenge it.43 If the decision was merely voidable, however, Dr. Mellis could not challenge
the order more than twenty-one days after it was entered. 44 The
court concluded that because the statute "permits a circuit court
to enter a reinstatement order without prior notice to anyone
when the circuit court has determined that there are no known
interested parties or counsel of record," the notice requirement
was not jurisdictional, and the order was merely voidable.45
Therefore, the appellant successfully insulated the circuit court's
erroneous order by filing a nonsuit. 4 6
The supreme court acknowledged in its opinion "that because
[the defendant] was not served in the nonsuited action[ ] and had
no other notice of those proceedings, he did not know that the
May 25, 2004 order of nonsuit had been entered and could have
been appealed."4 7 However, the court stated, "This problem...
cannot be considered in this collateral action but may raise a
question for the General Assembly's consideration in future revisions to Code § 8.01-335(B)."48
This is the same sort of challenge that the supreme court presented to the General Assembly in Janvier v. Arminio.4 9 Like
Hicks, Janvier addressed whether a particular code section, Virginia Code section 8.01-380(B), included a notice provision.5 0

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 218, 657 S.E.2d at 145.
Id.
Id. at 219, 657 S.E.2d at 145.
See id. (citing Collins v. Shepherd, 274 Va. 390, 402, 649 S.E.2d 672, 678 (2007)).
See id. (citing Singh v. Mooney, 261 Va. 48, 51-52, 541 S.E.2d 549, 551 (2001)).
Id. at 219-20, 657 S.E.2d at 145-46.
See id. at 220, 657 S.E.2d at 146.
Id. at 221, 657 S.E.2d at 146.
Id.
272 Va. 353, 366, 634 S.E.2d 754, 761 (2006).
Id. at 357, 634 S.E.2d at 755.
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Whereas the court in Hicks found a notice requirement, the court
in Janvier concluded that the General Assembly had not intended
to require notice.51 As the court noted in Hicks, the General Assembly amended section 8.01-380(B) in 2007 in response to Janvier "to require that a defendant be given notice of a plaintiffs request for a second or subsequent nonsuit."5 2 In light of the
General Assembly's immediate response to Janvier, the legislature likely will amend its statutes again to inform the supreme
court of its intentions more clearly.
D. The Medical Malpractice Settlement Offer and Recovery Act
Delegate Clifford L. Athey, Jr., of Virginia's 18th District proposed House Bill 1282 in January 2008.53 H.B. 1282, the Medical
Malpractice Settlement Offer and Recovery Act (the "Recovery
Act"), would alter substantially the legal landscape for medical
malpractice actions in Virginia. The Recovery Act would create a
new form of settlement that the defendant may offer voluntarily
within the first 180 days after filing a responsive pleading.54 The
settlement offer would be irrevocable, but the plaintiff would
have just thirty days to accept or reject the offer.55 Under the
proposed legislation, for the Recovery Act to apply, the offer must
cover the plaintiffs compensatory damages-including lost wages
and medical expenses-but it may not cover non-economic damages. 56 If the plaintiff rejects the offer, she must prove, by clear
and convincing evidence, that her injuries were the result of
"gross negligence or wanton and willful misconduct." 5 7 The Recovery Act was left in the House Committee for Courts of Justice
at the close of the 2008 Session.58 Practitioners in the legal and
medical fields will want to be aware of this legislation for the next
session.

51. Id. at 366, 634 S.E.2d at 760.
52. Hicks, 275 Va. at 220 n.1, 657 S.E.2d at 146 n.1.
53.

H.B. 1282, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008).

54.
55.

Id.
Id.

56.
57.

Id.
Id.

58. See Legislative Information System, Bill Tracking, H.B. 1282, http://legl.state.
va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?ses=081&typ=bil&val=hb1282 (last visited Oct. 28, 2008).
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II. ANTICIPATED CASES IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
The Supreme Court of Virginia is scheduled to hear several
medical malpractice cases in the next session. Like the potential
legislation described above, these cases will likely have significant impacts on the future of medical malpractice and health care
law in Virginia.
A. CharitableImmunity
1. Eastern Virginia Medical School Academic Physicians and
Surgeons Health Services Foundation
The Supreme Court of Virginia will address three cases concerning the charitable immunity status of Eastern Virginia Medical School Academic Physicians and Surgeons Health Services
Foundation: Mayfield-Brown v. Sayegh, Wright v. Silver, and
Clark v. De Veciana.5 9 In all three cases, the circuit court granted
the physician's plea of charitable immunity. 60 After the supreme
court's recent decision in University of Virginia Health Services
Foundation v. Morris, the resolution of these cases will be eagerly
anticipated. 6 1
2. The Morris Case
In Morris, the court addressed three appeals regarding the
charitable immunity status of the University of Virginia Health
Services Foundation ("HSF").62 In two of the cases, the trial court
denied the physician's plea while another court sustained it.63
The supreme court highlighted four of the 0la64 factors as demonstrating that HSF did not operate as a charitable organiza-

59. Supreme Court of Virginia Record No. 071167, available at http://courts.state.
va.us/scv/appeals/071167.html (last visited on Oct. 28, 2008); Supreme Court of Virginia
Record No. 071175, available at http://courts.state.va.us/scv/appeals/071175.html (last visited on Oct. 28, 2008); Supreme Court of Virginia Record No. 072312, available at
http:l/courts.state.va.us/scv/appeals/O72312.html(last visited on Oct. 28, 2008).

60.

Id.

61.
62.
63.
64.

275 Va. 319, 657 S.E.2d 512 (2008).
Id. at 329-30, 657 S.E.2d at 516-17.
Id.
Ola v. YMCA of S. Hampton Rds., Inc., 270 Va. 550, 621 S.E.2d 70 (2005).
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tion and, therefore, did not qualify for the immunity. 65 Specifically, the court noted (1) that HSF was created for billing and collection; (2) the ratio of HSF's cost of charitable service to revenue
(0.66% or $1,500,000/$225,898,000, according to the court's calculation); (3) that the profits are distributed in a bonus-like structure based on departmental revenue, not charitable care; and (4)
that HSF does not accept charitable gifts, lending further support
to the determination.66 Ultimately, the court focused on whether
67
HSF operated like a nonprofit or like a for-profit organization.
The court's decision was largely fact intensive. Similarly, the
outcome of the Eastern Virginia Medical School Academic Physicians and Surgeons Health Services Foundation cases likely will
turn on whether the court is convinced that the entity acted in a
nonprofit or a for-profit manner.
B. Wrongful Death and Survivorship Claims
The Supreme Court of Virginia is also scheduled to hear the
appeal in Centra Health, Inc. v. Mullins in the upcoming session. 68 The appellant presented the following assignment of error:
"The Circuit Court erred by denying the defendant's Motion to
Elect, and permitting the plaintiff to submit both a wrongful
death claim and a survivorship claim to the jury, rather than requiring the plaintiff to elect between them prior to trial."69
It is well-settled under Virginia law that a party may not collect for both wrongful death and survivorship claims. 70 However,
if and when the plaintiff must choose the preferred claim is unclear. The difference between a wrongful death claim and a survivorship claim lies in the damages allowed. 7 1 A survivorship claim
is limited to the damages that the decedent would have collected

65. See Morris,275 Va. at 335-39, 657 S.E.2d at 520-22.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 340, 657 S.E.2d at 522.
68. Supreme Court of Virginia Record No. 080008, available at http://courts.state.
va.us/scv/appeals/080008.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2008).

69. Id. The appellant also contends that the jury mistakenly returned a verdict on the
survivorship claim, even though the plaintiffs expert testified that the defendant's negligence caused the decedent's death. Id.
70. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-25, -56 (Repl. Vol. 2007); Hendrix v. Daugherty, 249
Va. 540, 547, 457 S.E.2d 71, 75-76 (1995).
71. Peter Vieth, High Court To Address Election of Remedies?, VA. LAW. WKLY., Mar.
24, 2008, at 1.
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if she had brought the claim during her lifetime, and punitive
damages are not allowed at all.7 2 In contrast, a plaintiff may collect punitive damages and solace damages in wrongful death actions. 73 Counsel for the appellant in Mullins contends that "evidence of a decedent's pain and suffering should be inadmissible in
a death action, and that evidence of the families' sorrow and loss
of solace should not be allowed in a survivorship claim." 74 This issue is becoming increasingly common with the rise in nursing
home malpractice cases. 75
III. RECENT LEGISLATION FROM THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Although the upcoming 2009 Session of the Virginia General
Assembly may be the more notable session in terms of changes to
medical malpractice law, the 2008 Session had several significant
contributions of its own.
A. VirginiaBirth-RelatedNeurological Injury Compensation
Program
In the 2008 Session, the General Assembly considered several
bills to amend the Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury
Compensation Program (the "Program"). 76 The Program provides
an exclusive no-fault-based recovery system for infants and their
representatives, where the infant suffered birth-related neurological injuries, if the birth was performed by a participating physician or in a participating hospital. 77 Much has been written, however, about the Program's financial troubles. 78 In 2007, the
Program was $127.6 million in debt.79 As the Richmond TimesDispatch reported earlier this year, "For the first time... children born in the past year are likely to outlive the current benefit

72. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-25 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
73. See id. §§ 8.01-50, -52 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Supp. 2008).
74. Vieth, supra note 71.
75. Id.
76. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-5000 to -5021 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Supp. 2008).
77. Id. at §§ 38.2-5002 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
78. See, e.g., Bill McKelway, Birth-Injury Fund Could Run 20 More Years, RICH.
TIMES-DISPATCH, May 14, 2008, at B12.
79. Id.; VIRGINIA BIRTH-RELATED NEUROLOGICAL INJURY COMPENSATION PROGRAM,
COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT 3 (2008), available at http://vabirthinjury.
com/documents/2007AnnualAudit.pdf.
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structure."80 House Bills 1305 and 1306 addressed, among other
things, amending the annual assessments for physicians to fund
the Program.81 The bills provided for an increase in participating
physician assessments from $5,100 per year to $5,600 per year,
with a $300 increase in 2010 and a $100 increase each year to a
maximum of $6,200 per year.8 2 The bills also increased the assessments for participating hospitals $2.50 per live birth per
year, from $50 to a maximum of $55 per live birth.83 House Bill
1305 was passed into law on March 10, 2008,84 but House Bill
1306 failed to pass.8 5
B. Definitions Under the Medical MalpracticeAct
House Bill 501, approved on March 3, 2008, amended Virginia
Code sections 8.01-581.1 and 8.01-581.20.86 The bill was introduced in response to Alcoy v. Valley Nursing Homes, Inc.,8 7 which
the Supreme Court of Virginia decided in 2006.88
In Alcoy, a decedent's representative brought claims of negligence, sexual assault, and battery against the nursing home
where the decedent lived and where he allegedly suffered a sexual assault by an unknown individual.89 The nursing home, Valley Nursing Homes, Inc. ("Valley"), argued that the "professional
services" it provided were covered by the Medical Malpractice Act
and, therefore, the Act, specifically section 8.01-581.20 regarding

80. McKelway, supra note 78.
81. See H.B. 1305, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Mar. 10,
2008, ch. 520, 2008 Va. Acts __J; H.B. 1306, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008).
82. H.B. 1305; H.B. 1306.
83. H.B. 1305; H.B. 1306.
84. Act of Mar. 10, 2008, ch. 520, 2008 Va. Acts (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 38.2-5008, -5009, -5016, -5020, -5021 (Supp. 2008)).
85. See Legislative Information System, Bill Tracking, H.B. 1306, http://leg1.state.
va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?ses=081&typ=bil&val=hbl306 (last visited Oct. 28, 2008). H.B.
1306 also provided for an increase in reimbursements to 120% and would have required all
Virginia licensed physicians to make non-participant payments into the system, not just
practicing physicians. See H.B. 1306.
86. H.B. 501, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Mar. 3, 2008, ch.
169, 2008 Va. Acts __); see also VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-581.1, -581.20 (Supp. 2008).
87. 272 Va. 37, 630 S.E.2d 301 (2006).
88. Legislative Information System, Bill Tracking, H.B. 501, http://legl.state.va.us/
cgi-bin/legp504.exe?ses=O81&typ=bil&val=hb501 (last visited Oct. 28, 2008). The bill
summary indicates the bill was introduced in response to Alcoy v. Valley Nursing Homes,
Inc. Id.
89. Alcoy, 272 Va. at 40, 630 S.E.2d at 302.

2008]

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

standard-of-care expert testimony, covered the administrator's
claims. 9 0 The trial court agreed, but the supreme court did not.91
The supreme court noted that the Medical Malpractice Act failed
to define "professional services," whereas it did define "malpractice" and "health care." 92 The court concluded that "the alleged
omissions involve[d] administrative, personnel, and security decisions related to the operation of the... facility, rather than to the
care of any particular patient."9 3
House Bill 501 amended section 8.01-581.1 to include "professional services in nursing homes" under the definition of "health
care" and also to include a definition for "professional services." 9 4
That statute now provides, in part:
"Professionalservices in nursing homes" means services provided in a
nursing home, as that term is defined in clause (iv) of the definition
of health care provider in this section, by a health care provider related to health care, staffing to provide patient care, psycho-social
services, personal hygiene, hydration, nutrition, fall assessments or
interventions, patient monitoring, prevention and treatment of med95
ical conditions, diagnosis or therapy.

The bill also amended section 8.01-581.20 to clarify that an expert satisfying the requirements of that section is necessary concerning the standard of care regarding professional services in a
nursing home. 9 6 Although the General Assembly clearly passed
House Bill 501 in response to Alcoy, the bill neither abrogates nor
codifies the Alcoy decision. It merely fills in the holes uncovered
by the court and clarifies the General Assembly's intent behind
the Medical Malpractice Act with regard to nursing homes.
C. Nursing Experts
In 2005, Virginia became a participant in the Nurse Licensure
Compact (the "Compact").97 The Compact allows nurses in partic-

90. Id. at 40-41, 630 S.E.2d at 302-03.
91.
92.

Id.
Id. at 42, 630 S.E.2d at 303.

93. Id. at 43, 630 S.E.2d at 304.
94. H.B. 501, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Mar. 3, 2008, ch.
169, 2008 Va. Acts ___); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.1 (Supp. 2008).
95. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.1 (Supp. 2008).
96. See H.B. 501; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.20 (Supp. 2008).
97. Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 249, 2003 Va. Acts 263 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 54.1-3007, -3030 to -3040 (Repl. Vol. 2005)).
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ipating states to practice in any other participating state without
applying for a license in that state. 9 8 This year the General Assembly passed House Bill 584 to amend Virginia Code section
8.01-581.20 to recognize the commonwealth's inclusion in the
Compact. 9 9 Section 8.01-581.20 now provides that "any nurse licensed by a state participating in the Nurse Licensure Compact"
is presumed to know the standard of care for a nurse practicing in
Virginia. 100

D. Statute of Limitations
Perhaps the most significant legislative change from this past
session was House Bill 616, which amended the statute of limitations. 101 The Supreme Court of Virginia has refused repeatedly to
adopt the "discovery" rule for applying the statute of limitations.1 02 Historically, the "discovery" rule establishes that the
statute of limitations does not begin to run until the harm is discovered or should have been discovered.103 To clarify the rule in
Virginia, the General Assembly provided a modified discovery
rule in certain circumstances, such as in retained foreign object
cases and in cases involving fraud and deception.104 House Bill
616 provides a new factual scenario giving rise to the discovery
rule. As passed, the bill amended Virginia Code section 8.01243(C) to include the following provision:
In a claim for the negligent failure to diagnose a malignant tumor or
cancer, for a period of one year from the date the diagnosis of a malignant tumor or cancer is communicated to the patient by a health
care provider, provided the health care provider's underlying act or
omission was on or after July 1, 2008. Claims under this section for
the negligent failure to diagnose a malignant tumor or cancer, where
the health care provider's underlying act or omission occurred prior

98. See Virginia Board of Nursing, Nurse Licensure Compact, http://www.dhp.virgi
nia.gov/nursing/nursing-compact.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2008).
99. H.B. 584, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Mar. 2, 2008, ch.
125, 2008 Va. Acts .__); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.20 (Supp. 2008).
100. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.20 (Supp. 2008).
101. H.B. 616, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Mar. 3, 2008, ch.
175, 2008 Va. Acts .. __).
102. See, e.g., Lo v. Burke, 249 Va. 311, 317, 455 S.E.2d 9, 13 (1995) (citing Locke v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 221 Va. 951, 959, 275 S.E.2d 900, 905-06 (1981)).
103. Locke, 221 Va. at 959, 275 S.E.2d at 905.
104. Act of Apr. 3, 1986, ch. 389, 1986 Va. Acts 650 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 8.01-38, -243 (Supp. 2008)).
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to July 1, 2008, shall be governed by the statute of limitations that
existed prior to July 1, 2008.105

This statute will affect a very narrow class of malpractice cases
and will not begin to affect cases for at least another two years, as
it only applies to negligent acts occurring after July 1, 2008.106
Notwithstanding, it has settled the issue of when the statute begins to run in cancer cases and likely will be an important tool for
claimants in the future.
This amendment presents several important questions Virginia
courts will have to address in the future. First, when must a patient's tumor be malignant? Must the physician have failed to diagnose a malignant tumor, or may a misdiagnosed benign tumor
become malignant? In Lo v. Burke, the physician failed to diagnose a benign tumor that subsequently became malignant.10 7 The
Supreme Court of Virginia determined that the injury did not occur until the tumor became malignant and that the defendant
failed to prove when that occurred.lOS If the court determines
that this statute applies when the physician fails to diagnose a
benign tumor, the amendment likely would abrogate Lo by providing a set date upon which the statute of limitations begins to
run. Courts could conclude, however, that the physician must
have failed to diagnose a malignant tumor for this statute to apply.
Second, if courts determine that the physician must misdiagnose a malignant tumor, an issue arises concerning when and
how a plea of the statute of limitations can be made. As in Lo, the
issue of when the tumor became malignant can be a difficult factual question. As such, it likely will require a jury determination
before the statute of limitations may be imposed. The question
becomes, which party has the burden of proof? Traditionally, as in
Lo, the defendant has the burden of proof concerning the statute
of limitations.10 9 In this case, however, the statute extends the
time that the plaintiff has to bring a claim,110 suggesting that the
plaintiff would have the burden. Practitioners may want to consider these issues when addressing this statute.

105. Act of Mar. 3, 2008, ch. 175, 2008 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-243(c)(3) (Supp. 2008)).
106. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-243(c)(3) (Supp. 2008).
107. 249 Va. 311, 313, 455 S.E.2d 9, 10-11 (1995).
108. Id. at 316, 455 S.E.2d at 12.
109. Id.
110. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-243(c)(3) (Supp. 2008).
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SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS FROM THE
SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA

A. John Crane, Inc. v. Jones
In September of 2007, the Supreme Court of Virginia decided
John Crane, Inc. v. Jones, a significant case for medical malpractice jurisprudence.ill Although Jones is not a medical malpractice case, it addressed the sufficiency of expert disclosures.112 Because medical malpractice cases almost always require expert
testimony, the import of this case on medical malpractice cases is

self-evident. 113
In Jones, the plaintiff brought a products liability claim after
being diagnosed with mesothelioma from inhaling asbestos
dust.114 The trial court disallowed testimony of two of the defendant's expert witnesses, and the defendant appealed.115 The supreme court affirmed the trial court's decision after determining
that the defendant had not satisfied the expert disclosure requirements of Virginia Supreme Court Rule 4:l(b)(4)(A)(i).116
Rule 4:l(b)(4)(A)(i) provides:
A party may through interrogatories require any other party to identify each person whom the other party expects to call as an expert
witness at trial, to state the subject matter on which the expert is
expected to testify, and to state the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of the
117
grounds for each opinion.

As to its first expert, the defendant failed to disclose that the
expert would "testify about asbestos in the ambient air."118 The
court overruled the defendant's argument that the plaintiff was
aware of this potential testimony, stating that "a party is not re-

111.

274 Va. 581,650 S.E.2d 851 (2007).

112.

Id. at 591, 650 S.E.2d at 856.

113.

See Raines v. Lutz, 231 Va. 110, 113, 341 S.E.2d 194, 196 (1986) ("We have held

that expert testimony is ordinarily necessary to establish the appropriate standard of care,
to establish a deviation from the standard, and to establish that such a deviation was the
proximate cause of the claimed damages." (citing Bly v. Rhoads, 216 Va. 645, 653, 222
S.E.2d 783, 789 (1976))).
114. Jones, 274 Va. at 585, 650 S.E.2d at 852.
115. Id. at 586, 650 S.E.2d at 853.
116. Id. at 591-93, 650 S.E.2d at 856-57.
117. VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:1(b)(4)(A)(i) (2008).
118. Jones, 274 Va. at 592, 650 S.E.2d at 856.
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lieved from its disclosure obligation under the Rule simply because the other party has some familiarity with the expert witness or the opportunity to depose the expert."11 9
In the case of the second expert, the defendant disclosed the
"topic" of the expert's testimony, but failed to disclose its "substance."1 20 Although the defendant disclosed that the expert
"would offer testimony on, among other topics, his 'research
and/or his testing of various asbestos insulation products,"' it
failed to attach the expert's report of that testing. 12 1 Thus, Jones
makes it clear that an expert disclosure must specifically provide
the topic and substance of all of the expert's proffered testimony.1 22 Additionally, the disclosing party cannot excuse a substandard disclosure by arguing that the other party had notice of the
testimony. 123
B. Dagner v. Anderson
In Dagner v. Anderson, the Supreme Court of Virginia determined whether the defendant's expert was qualified to offer proffered testimony.1 2 4 The administratrix of the deceased patient's
estate brought a claim against the hospital and emergency room
physician that treated the decedent prior to her death.125 The decedent was a diabetic and went to the emergency room after her
daughter found her unconscious.1 2 6 She had not eaten and had
consumed a significant amount of alcohol.12 7 Following an injection of glucagon en route to the hospital and several tests in the
emergency room, the physician discharged her after determining
that she was stable. 128 Over eight hours later, the decedent was
found in a comatose state in the waiting area and died several
months later without regaining consciousness. 129 At trial, the

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
around

Id.
Id. at 592-93, 650 S.E.2d at 857.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 592, 650 S.E.2d at 856.
274 Va. 678, 680-81, 651 S.E.2d 640, 641 (2007).
Id. at 683, 651 S.E.2d at 642.
Id. at 681, 651 S.E.2d at 641.
Id.
Id. at 681-82, 651 S.E.2d at 641-42.
Id. at 683, 651 S.E.2d at 642. The attending nurse called the decedent's daughter
the time of discharge. Id. at 682, 651 S.E.2d at 642. The daughter, however, told
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physician introduced an expert in emergency medicine to testify,
among other things, that the decedent died of an Alcohol Withdrawal Syndrome ("AWS") seizure.13 0 The plaintiff appealed the
propriety of this testimony.131
The supreme court determined that although it was appropriate for the defendant to introduce evidence concerning AWS, the
proffered expert was not qualified to testify that AWS caused the
decedent's brain injury and death.132 The proffered expert was an
emergency room physician with experience treating AWS seizures. 133 The court concluded that the expert's "stated familiarity

with AWS in the context of treating patients in an emergency department setting is not a sufficient basis for the circuit court to
have qualified him as an expert on the issue of whether [the decedent] suffered an AWS seizure."1 34 Thus, the court indicated
that experience in treating a disorder does not supply the necessary knowledge for testifying about the cause of that disorder.135
C. Bostic v. About Women OB/GYN, P.C.
The issue in Bostic v. About Women OB/GYN, P.C. was whether the defense properly laid a foundation for introducing medical
literature.13 6 Virginia Code section 8.01-401.1 provides:
To the extent called to the attention of an expert witness upon crossexamination or relied upon by the expert witness in direct examination, statements contained in published treatises, periodicals or
pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine or other science or art,
established as a reliable authority by testimony or by stipulation
13 7
shall not be excluded as hearsay.

The plaintiff filed suit on behalf of her infant child, who was
diagnosed with Erb's palsy as a result of shoulder dystocia during

the nurse that she could not come until the next morning. Id. The nurse did not relay the
daughter's message to the decedent or to the physician. Id.
130. Id. at 684, 651 S.E.2d at 643.
131. Id. at 685, 651 S.E.2d at 644.
132. Id. at 686-88, 651 S.E.2d at 644-45.
133. Id. at 684, 687, 651 S.E.2d at 643-45.
134. Id. at 687, 651 S.E.2d at 645.
135. See id.
136.

275 Va. 567, 570, 659 S.E.2d 290, 291 (2008); see VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-401.1

(Repl. Vol. 2007 & Supp. 2008).
137. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-401.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Supp. 2008).
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delivery.' 38 The defense argued that "maternal propulsive forces
of labor" caused the injury, not the negligence of the nurse midwife.139 The defense introduced medical literature that stated,
'During the past 15 years studies have provided considerable indirect evidence that maternal propulsive forces are responsible
for the injury leading to Erb's palsy,"' first through the nurse, a
fact witness, and then through its expert.1 4 0 The plaintiff argued
that the defense had not laid a proper foundation, and the Supreme Court of Virginia agreed. 1 4 i The court concluded that "the
circuit court erred in admitting the opinions contained in published medical literature without an adequate foundation as required by Code § 8.01-401.1."142
In explaining its conclusion, the court stated that "the precondition that the testifying witness must have 'relied upon' the published article before it may be read into evidence does not mean
that he accepts it only partially and is unwilling fully to subscribe
to its views."143 The defense's expert seemed to have doomed his
own testimony by testifying that he relied upon the article "to
talk to this jury."144 The court concluded that the statute requires
the expert to rely upon the article when forming his opinions, not
just when he is preparing for trial.1 45 The court seems to have
engrafted this rule upon the statute. The plain language of the
statute does not clarify when the expert must have come to rely
upon the literature. In fact, the statute only says that the expert
14 6
needs to rely upon the literature during direct examination.
Additionally, defense counsel asked the expert: "Do you agree
with the following: 'During the past 15 years, studies have provided considerable indirect evidence that maternal propulsive
forces are responsible for the injury leading to Erb's palsy.' Do
you agree with that?" In reply, the expert stated that he "would

138. Bostic, 275 Va. at 570-71, 659 S.E.2d at 291-92.
139. Id. at 571, 659 S.E.2d at 292.
140. See id. at 571-73, 659 S.E.2d at 292-93 (quoting Herbert F. Sandmire, M.D. &
Robert K. DeMott, M.D., Erb's Palsy Causation: Iatrogenic or Resulting from Labor
Forces?, 2005 J. REPROD. MED. 563, 563).
141. Id. at 578, 659 S.E.2d at 295-96.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 577, 659 S.E.2d at 295.
144. See id. at 573, 659 S.E.2d at 293.
145. Id. at 577, 659 S.E.2d at 295.
146. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-401.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Supp. 2008).

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:227

use the word 'could be responsible."'i 4 7 The court concluded that
because the expert was unwilling to accept the conclusions of the
article in whole, the proper foundation was lacking.1 48 Thus, the
court declared that to lay the foundation adequately for medical
literature under section 8.01-401.1, the expert must testify that
she relied upon the literature when forming her opinion in the
case, which requires full acceptance of the conclusions of the article.14 9 Therefore, when deposing experts, counsel should probe
the experts on this issue concerning any articles that the opposing party identifies as reliable.
D. Lloyd v. Kime
In Lloyd v. Kime, the Supreme Court of Virginia addressed
whether the trial court improperly used deposition testimony
when considering a motion in limine and whether the trial court
improperly excluded the plaintiffs expert as unqualified under
Virginia Code section 8.01-581.20.150 Lloyd underwent an anterior cervical discectomy decompression by Dr. Kime to repair two
herniated disks.151 Following the surgery, Lloyd alleged that Dr.
Kime "was negligent in performing the surgery" and failed to recognize a partial spinal cord injury.1 52 The plaintiffs only expert
was a neurologist proffered to offer testimony that Dr. Kime negligently performed the surgery and that his post-operative care
caused Lloyd's injury.1 5 3 At trial, Dr. Kime moved to exclude
Lloyd's expert as unqualified under section 8.01-581.20, which
motion the trial court granted, relying upon deposition testimony.1 54 Dr. Kime then moved for summary judgment because the
plaintiff lacked necessary expert testimony; the court also
granted that motion.155
The first issue the supreme court addressed was whether the
trial court erred in using deposition testimony when considering

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Bostic, 275 Va. at 573, 659 S.E.2d at 293.
See id. at 577, 659 S.E.2d at 295.
See id.
275 Va. 98, 103, 654 S.E.2d 563, 566 (2008).
Id.
Id. at 104-05, 654 S.E.2d at 567.
Id. at 105, 654 S.E.2d at 567.
Id.
Id.
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the motion in limine. 15 6 Technically, Rule 3:20 only prevents the
use of deposition testimony to support motions for summary
judgment or motions to strike.15 7 the court declared, however,
that a motion in limine to exclude an expert "is functionally a motion for summary judgment" when that motion in limine "is followed by [a] motion for summary judgment."15 8 The court cited
Parker v. Elco Elevator Corp. to support its conclusion. 15 9 The
ParkerCourt, however, did not establish the rule as urged by the
Lloyd Court. In fact, the Parker Court refused to make that determination as it was unnecessary to the resolution of the case. 1 60
In contrast, although not clearly necessary to resolve the case at
bar, the Lloyd Court officially set forth this limitation on the use
of depositions, a once common defense tool.161
The supreme court did not need to address whether deposition
testimony could be used because, as the court later concluded, the
plaintiff had acquiesced in the trial court's use of the deposition
testimony.16 2 Dr. Kime argued that because the plaintiff utilized
deposition testimony to oppose the motion in limine, he had acquiesced.163 The court, however, noted that deposition testimony
is barred only to support a motion for summary judgment, not to
oppose one. 16 4 Instead, the court held that Lloyd had failed to object to the use of deposition testimony and therefore acquiesced.165
The next issue the supreme court faced was whether Lloyd's
expert, a neurologist, was qualified to give the proffered testimony against Dr. Kime, an orthopedic surgeon. 16 6 Regarding intra
operative negligence, the plaintiff was unable to demonstrate an
overlap between the two fields, and Dr. Kime demonstrated that
156. Id. at 106, 654 S.E.2d at 568.
157. VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:20 (2008).
158. Lloyd, 275 Va. at 107, 654 S.E.2d at 568.
159. Id. (citing Parker v. Elco Elevator Corp., 250 Va. 278, 281 n.2, 462 S.E.2d 98, 100
n.2 (1995)).
160. Parker,250 Va. at 281 n.2, 462 S.E.2d at 100 n.2. Parker did not object to the use
of the deposition testimony. Id. Thus, the court did not consider such use when reviewing-and ruling on-the issues on appeal. See id.
161. Lloyd, 275 Va. at 107, 654 S.E.2d at 568.
162. Id. at 107-08, 654 S.E.2d at 568-69.
163. Id. at 107, 654 S.E.2d at 568.
164. Id. (citing W. HAMILTON BRYSON, BRYSON ON VIRGINIA CIVIL PROCEDURE §
9.05(10)(e) (4th ed. 2005)).
165. Id. at 107-08, 654 S.E.2d at 568-69.
166. See id. at 108-10, 654 S.E.2d at 569-70.
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the expert had not performed any surgery since 1997.167 Lloyd
argued that because the parties did not dispute the standard of
care, section 8.01-581.20 did not apply.i 6 8 Nevertheless, the court
concluded that the requirements of that section are mandatory. 16 9 In the area of post-operative care, however, the plaintiff did
demonstrate an overlap between neurology and orthopedics and,
therefore, the expert was qualified to testify regarding the postoperative negligence.70 Finally, the court concluded that the trial
court erred when it excluded the expert's testimony on proximate
causation.171 The court stated that the section 8.01-581.20 "requirements do not address whether an expert witness is qualified
to testify on proximate causation."17 2 Therefore, even though the
expert could not testify that the defendant negligently performed
the surgery, the expert could testify that the negligence caused
the alleged harm. 17 3
E. Coston v. Bio-Medical Applications of Virginia, Inc.
Coston v. Bio-Medical Applications of Virginia, Inc. exemplifies
the increasingly regular "common knowledge and experience" exception to the requirement of expert testimony.174 The facts in
Coston are unremarkable. The medical facility's staff placed the
patient into a defective chair during dialysis; the chair failed,
dumping the patient onto the floor.175 After the plaintiff failed to
identify any experts, the defense successfully moved for summary
judgment.176 The plaintiff appealed, arguing that she did not require experts.177 The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed several
of the major cases that addressed the necessity of expert testimony in medical malpractice cases before summarily concluding that
"the issue whether the defendant's acts or omissions in this case
constitute medical negligence is within a jury's common know167.
168.
169.
S.E.2d
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 111, 654 S.E.2d at 570.
Id.
Id. (quoting Perdieu v. Blackstone Family Practice Ctr., Inc., 264 Va. 408, 419, 568
703, 709 (2002)).
Id. at 111-12, 654 S.E.2d at 570-71.
Id. at 112, 654 S.E.2d at 571.
Id.
Id. at 113, 654 S.E.2d at 571.
275 Va. 1, 4, 654 S.E.2d 560, 561 (2008).
Id. at 3, 654 S.E.2d at 561.
Id. at 3-4, 654 S.E.2d at 561.
Id. at 4, 654 S.E.2d at 561.
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ledge and experience and, therefore, expert testimony is not necessary."17 8
What is most enlightening about Coston is that it denotes a
shift in the court's view of the necessity of expert witnesses to
prove a prima facie case of medical negligence. In Dickerson v.
Fatehi,the court stated, "In almost all medical malpractice cases,
expert testimony is necessary to assist a jury ...[but] [i]n certain

rare cases, however, when the alleged negligent acts or omissions
clearly lie within the range of a jury's common knowledge and experience, expert testimony is unnecessary."1 7 9 In a subtle, but
perhaps telling contrast, the Coston opinion declares that "issues
involving medical negligence often fall beyond the realm of the
common knowledge and experience of a lay jury."180 The number
and regularity of cases falling within the "common knowledge and
experience" exception seems to have increased in the last decade.
This statement, that medical issues "often"iS-as opposed to almost always-require expert testimony,18 2 suggests a shift in the
court's view and a sign that counsel may see more cases proceeding to trial without expert testimony.
F. Webb v. Smith
Following Coston, the Supreme Court of Virginia heard another
case regarding the necessity of expert testimony in Webb v.
Smith.183 In Webb, the plaintiff, suffering "pain associated with
her menstrual cycle," sought the services of Dr. Smith for a hysterectomy and bilateral salpingo-oophorectomy ("BSO").184 "Dr.
Smith performed the hysterectomy" but, according to the court,
"he forgot to perform the BSO."185 The plaintiff presented an expert who testified to the standard of care, but not to causation;
instead, Webb herself testified that Dr. Smith's failure to perform
the BSO necessitated a second surgery.18 6 Following a jury ver178.
179.
ed).
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at 5-7, 654 S.E.2d at 562-63.
253 Va. 324, 327, 484 S.E.2d 880, 881-82 (1997) (citation omitted) (emphasis addCoston, 275 Va. at 5, 654 S.E.2d at 562 (emphasis added).
Id.
See Dickerson, 253 Va. at 327, 484 S.E.2d at 881.
276 Va. 305, 308, 661 S.E.2d 457, 459 (2008).
Id. at 307, 661 S.E.2d at 458.
Id.
Id.
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dict for the plaintiff, the trial court granted Dr. Smith's motion to
strike, which it had taken under advisement following the plaintiffs case-in-chief.18 7 The supreme court reversed the trial court
and reinstated the jury's verdict, declaring:
As a result of Dr. Smith's failure to perform the BSO, Webb had to
undergo the second surgery and incur damages attendant thereto. A
reasonably intelligent juror did not need an expert to explain why
Dr. Smith's negligence was the proximate cause of Webb's damages
because the issue of causation was within the common knowledge of
laymen. 188

Especially intriguing about Webb is that it is one of the truly
"rare" cases from the supreme court in the area of medical malpractice that includes a dissenting opinion.189 The dissent highlighted two dichotomies between the plaintiffs case and the majority's opinion: the distinction between an elective surgery and a
medically necessary surgery, and the distinction between tort law
and contract law. 190

First, the dissent noted that "Webb casts her argument in
terms suggesting that the two medical procedures she consented
for Dr. Smith to perform were 'elective."'19 1 In contrast, Webb's
testimony and the majority's opinion stated that she 'needed"'
the BS0192 and "had to undergo the second surgery."1 93 Furthermore, the dissent noted that Dr. Smith presented testimony,
including from Webb's expert, that showed that a surgeon could
decide within the standard of care not to perform the BSO if unnecessary, as Dr. Smith argued he did.194 The dissent thus concluded, "Only a medical expert witness could testify as to whether
Webb needed to have the BSO during the first surgery and,
whether as a result of Dr. Smith's failure to perform the BSO, it
remained medically necessary for her to undergo that procedure,
thereby requiringthe second surgery."19 5

187. Id. at 306-07, 661 S.E.2d at 458.
188. Id. at 308, 661 S.E.2d at 459.
189. See id. at 309-11, 661 S.E.2d at 459-61 (Kinser, J., dissenting). According to the
authors' count, the supreme court has released just three dissents in the twenty-seven
medical malpractice cases since 2006.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 309, 661 S.E.2d at 460.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 308, 661 S.E.2d at 459 (majority opinion).
194. Id. at 309-10, 661 S.E.2d at 460 (Kinser, J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 310, 661 S.E.2d at 460 (emphasis added).
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The dissent noted that the trial court recognized the second dichotomy.196 The dissent stated, "The majority fails to recognize
the distinction that the trial court correctly pointed out in its letter opinion, [that] '[t]his cause of action is one for medical malpractice based on negligence, not breach of contract."'1 9 7 The dissent noted that the plaintiffs evidence, including the expert
testimony, was limited to the fact that "Dr. Smith, during the
first surgery did not perform a procedure that he had agreed to
perform."198 The majority concluded that this agreement necessitated the second surgery.1 9 9 As the dissent concluded, however,
under a tort theory, the question is not one of failed contractual
expectations but of medical necessity. 2 00
Like Coston, Webb exemplifies the supreme court's growing leniency concerning the requirement of expert testimony. The
court's opinion likely is limited to the specific facts. However, it
could have a broader implication concerning the distinction between contract law and tort law in the medical malpractice arena.
Because the relationship between a doctor and a patient is largely
contractual, the court may have intentionally or unintentionally
established a "failed expectation" basis for a malpractice case.
The court may have to clarify its opinion in the future.
G. Williams v. Le
Williams v. Le revisited the concept of superseding intervening
causation in a medical malpractice action. 201 The plaintiff saw
her physician for pain in her leg and was referred to the defendant's practice for a Doppler ultrasound. 2 02 The defendant, a diagnostic radiologist, diagnosed the plaintiff with deep vein
thrombosis, a blood clot in the leg that presents a risk of pulmonary embolism. 203 The defendant attempted to contact the plaintiffs primary care physician by phone, but never spoke to the
physician or left a message, and ultimately ordered that a report

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 308, 661 S.E.2d at 459 (majority opinion).
Id. at 310-11, 661 S.E.2d at 460 (Kinser, J., dissenting).
276 Va. 161, 163, 662 S.E.2d 73, 75 (2008).
Id. at 163, 662 S.E.2d at 75.
Id. at 164, 662 S.E.2d at 75.
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be sent by fax.204 The plaintiffs primary care physician did not
see the report prior to the plaintiffs death from a pulmonary embolism.205 The defendant sought and received the following instruction at trial:
A superseding cause is an independent event, not reasonably foreseeable, that completely breaks the connection between the Defendant's negligent act and the alleged injury or death. A superseding
cause breaks the chain of events so that the Defendant's original
negligent act is not a proximate cause of the Plaintiffs injury in the
2 06
slightest degree.

The Supreme Court of Virginia, concluded that the trial court
erred in granting this instruction. 20 7 The court declared that an
instruction may only be given if the evidence supports "the theory
of the instruction." 20 8 Specifically, the instruction is only appropriate if the alleged cause was the only cause of the injury,
"'without any contributing negligence by [the defendant] in the
slightest degree."'209 In this case, the court determined that the
defendant's failure to contact the primary care physician contributed to the primary care physician's failure to read the report.210
This case highlights the difficulty in obtaining a superseding
and intervening cause instruction at the conclusion of trial. As
the plaintiffs lawyer Stephanie Grana suggests, "'[T]rial judges
are going to be very careful about giving this instruction."' 2 1 1
Grana also notes that Virginia's Model Jury Instructions do not
include the limitation "[riarely given," but she suggests the editors may wish to add that warning in the future.212

204. Id.
205. Id. at 165, 662 S.E.2d at 76.
206. Id. at 166, 662 S.E.2d at 76.
207. Id. at 167-68, 662 S.E.2d at 77.
208. Id. at 167, 662 S.E.2d at 77.
209. Id. (quoting Atkinson v. Scheer, 256 Va. 448, 454, 508 S.E.2d 68, 72 (1998)).
210. Id.
211. Peter Vieth, Doctor on Hold: Radiologist Failed To Get Info to Primary Doc Before
Death, VA. LAW. WKLY., June 16, 2008, at 1.
212. Id.; see also VA. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CML, Jury Instr. No. 5.010 (Repl.
Vol. 2008).
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CONCLUSION

The once finite body of law in this practice area is changing.
The predictable amendments to, and interpretation of, that body
of law are no more. Expect activity in the General Assembly this
year to an extent not seen for ten years. In addition, applying recent supreme court opinions to the practice of medical litigation
will prove interesting-the impact of the cases will remain unknown for some time. The most important change could be the
anticipated amendments to the cap on recovery, which will reveal
itself soon enough. It will undoubtedly be an exciting time at the
legislature for those who represent parties to medical malpractice
litigation and make up the health care community in Virginia.

